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I. INTRODUCTION
Although America's societal growth and development have always been
influenced by a diverse number of social, political, and technological advances,
one factor that has remained constant is the age composition of our culture.1
Today, for the first time, the aging of America's workforce 2 is causing society
to examine the role of the older worker.
1 The Age Wave, TRAINING & DEV. J., Feb. 1990, at 22,24. (An interview with
Ken Dychtwald).
2 Jeffrey L. Sheler, The Aging Worker: Asset and Liability, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. May 4, 1981, at 76. Several demographic changes are occurring which
cause the age wave. The first is the "senior boom" caused by breakthroughs in
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In light of this change there is growing concern about the effects of ageism,
the "'process of systematic stereotyping of and discrimination against people
because they are old'."3 Instead of imposing mandatory retirement upon older
workers, or simply failing to hire them, those who are able to contribute should
be utilized to their fullest capacity; their experience and productivity could
enhance and enrich the workplace.4 The difficulty in adapting to this change
lies in the fact that age has been used as a prediction of behavior and as a
benchmark of ability.5 Our society has failed to realize that there are individual
differences in traits and abilities and that chronological age alone should not
be used as an arbitrary classification of ability.6
medicine which have eliminated many of the diseases that in the past have
maintained, on the average, a young age of death. One hundred years ago, only
three million Americans, or four percent of the population, were over the age
of sixty-five. In 1990, more than thirty million people or twelve percent of our
population were over sixty-five. For the first time in our history, we are creating
a mass society of healthy, active older people. The second demographic current
is the "birth dearth." Although there are twice as many women of childbearing
age today as there were in their parents' generation, they are bearing only half
as many children. The births that would otherwise even out the balance
between old and young people are simply not occurring. In addition, the
middle-aging of the Baby Boom generation has compounded the effects of the
senior boom and the birth dearth. Today most Boomers are in their thirties and
early forties. Thus the "leading edge of the boomer generation" will be
approaching age fifty, bringing a youth-focused era to an end while beginning
the age wave. The Age Wave, supra note 1, at 24.
3 James E. Birren & Wendy L. Loucks, Age Related Change and the Individual,
57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 833 (1981) (quoting ROBERT N. BUTLER, WHY SURVIVE?
BEING OLD IN AMERICA 12 (1975)).
4 Hearings on Age-60 Rule for Pilots Before the House Select Committee
(statement of Rep. Roybal), DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 202 at E-1 (October 18,
1985). Discrimination in employment based upon age not only bars an entire
portion of our population from contributing to societal growth, it also results
in older workers suffering economic hardship and stigmatization. Id.
5 Birren & Loucks, supra note 3, at 849. Because age is an objective index of
the passage of time in one's life, it is often used to predict one's functional
capabilities; both physical and mental. Id. The foregoing conclusion, however,
is often tenuous at best. Reliance on age overlooks the fact that one is subject
to varying opportunities, experiences, and physiological procedures that affect
one's aging pattern. Accordingly, the distinction between "age" and "aging"
must be noted. Id. Aging consists of concurrent biological, psychological, and
social processes. Id. Therefore, while age may be used as an index of different
human traits, it should not be discounted that each person's capabilities may
differ at any given age. Id.




Over the past twenty years drastic changes have been made in an attempt
to deal with this problem. Statutory enactments, the most significant of which
have been Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA), 8 as well as court decisions interpreting their
application, have been crucial to the development of a fair legal relationship
between employers and elderly employees.9
Industries that have been particularly susceptible to charges of age
discrimination are those in which the very nature of the enterprise presents an
inherent risk to public safety.10 An example is the airline industry, where
airlines make it a practice to discriminate against older pilots when making
742 U.S.C. §§ 2000 e-1 to 2000 e-7 (1988). Recently, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 122-166,105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981). The 1991 amendment was established to "respond to recent
Supreme Court decisions by restoring the Civil Rights protections that were
dramatically limited by those decisions" and to "strengthen existing protections
and remedies available under federal civil rights laws." H.R. Rep. No. 102-40,
102nd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1 (1991).
8 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202,
81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34). The Act
prohibits age discrimination in employment by employers, labor
organizations, and employment agencies. Id. § 623.
9 Judicial decisions involving claims brought under Title VII and the ADEA
have been instrumental in addressing many of the problems older employees
face. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985)
(invalidating TWA's employment policy under § 4(a)(1) of the ADEA because
it was not applied uniformly throughout the company and resulted in
discrimination against older workers); McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973) (establishing proof requirements of a prima facie case of
discrimination under Title VII); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d
859 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that the employer bears the burden of establishing
that its hiring policy falls within the BFOQ defense), cert. denied sub. nom.
Brennan v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). Compare Smallwood v.
United Airlines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007
(1982) (holding that the airline's refusal to employ a 48-year-old pilot violated
the ADEA) with Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982) (holding that the airline's refusal to hire
a 43-year-old pilot did not violate the ADEA). See generally Franklin A.
Nachman, Hiring, Firing, and Retiring; Recent Developments in Airline Labor and
Employment Law, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 31 (1987).
1
°See, e.g., Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985); Trans World
Airlines v. Thurston, Inc., 469 U.S. 111 (1985); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d
859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub. nom. Brennan v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 419
U.S. 1122 (1975); Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
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employment decisions. 11 This situation has arisen as the result of Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations and stereotypical judgments about
older people.1 2
This note will examine administrative and judicial standards used to prevent
age discrimination in employment decisions. The first section will analyze the
ADEA, enacted in response to the growing concern about age discrimination. 13
The second section will discuss the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
(BFOQ) exception to the ADEA's prohibition against age discrimination. 14
1 Cheryl Hammond Raper, Comment, Age Discrimination in the Airline
Industry: Is Age a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification for the Position of Pilot?, 55
J. AIR L. & COM. 543,544 (1989).
12 Id.
13 Section 621(a) of the ADEA contains a statement of the congressional
findings:
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers
find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employ-
ment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise
desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment
with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability
is, relative to the younger ages, high among older workers; their
numbers are great and growing; and their employment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary discrimin-
ation in employment because of age, burdens commerce and the free
flow of goods in commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 621(a).
14 ADEA, § 623(a)-(c), (f). This section declares it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indivi-
dual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter.
Id. § 623(a).
The "Bona Fide Occupational Qualification" (BFOQ) exception declares it
'not to be unlawful" for an employer, employment agency or labor
organization:
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c) or




Finally, the concerns particular to the airline industry regarding its age-related
policies will be presented together with the responses of the FAA, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the judiciary in an
attempt to clarify and resolve the difficulties inherent in situations where safety
is a major concern.
II. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
A. History
Congress initially considered the inclusion of a ban on age discrimination in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15 Although age, due to its distinct
nature,16 was not included in Title VII's prohibitions, Congress requested that
the Secretary of Labor formulate a report regarding the problem of age discrim-
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business,
or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age ....
Id. § 623(f).
15 john A. Obee & Janet C. Cooper, Comment, Age Discrimination in
Employment - the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense - Balancing the
Interest of the Older Worker in Acquiring and Continuing Employment Against the
Interest in Public Safety, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1339 (1978). The prohibition against
age discrimination proposed for Title VII was rejected in an effort to assure the
rapid passage of a statute covering other types of discrimination, particularly
racial discrimination; thus, the "cause was good, 'the timing [was] bad'."
LAWRENCE MEIR FRIEDMAN, YOUR TIME WILL COME: THE LAW OF AGE
DISCRIMINATIONAND MANDATORY RETIREMENT 14 (1984).
16 See Peter H. Harris, Note, Age Discrimination, Wages, and Economics: What
Judicial Standard?, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY. 715, 732 (Spring 1990). Age
discrimination is distinct in several ways. First, age is not an immutable
characteristic; one's age changes over time. This distinction is important to note
in that blacks, for example, have often had fewer educational opportunities in
the past, and requiring minimum educational standards unrelated to a
particular job would perpetuate the harm caused by past discrimination. Older
persons, however, have not faced life-long bias, and in all probability will not
be barred from employment opportunities as minorities have. Second, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged differences between age and other
protected categories in litigation under the Equal Protection Clause. Third, at
some point in everyone's life, age may affect the ability to work. Focusing on
the aged as a group rather than on an individualized basis only maintains
stereotypes and arbitrary classifications of older workers. Id.
In addition, various court decisions consider age to be worthy of its own
judicial standards in view of the unique aspects of age discrimination.
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (holding that
age is different from race because the aged do not have a history of blatant,
deliberate discrimination and are not an insular minority).
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ination in employment.17 In so doing, the Secretary of Labor determined that
discrimination against the older worker was prevalent and that the
implementation of a federal policy was the only means of eliminating such
practices. 18 As a result, in 1967, Congress enacted the ADEA 19 to promote the
employment of older persons based on ability rather than age, to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment, and to help workers and
employers overcome the difficulties associated with the impact of age in
employment.20
The ADEA forbids an employer engaged in an industry "affecting
commerce" who has twenty or more employees,2 1 from failing or refusing to
hire or to discharge an individual because of her age.22 In 1974, the ADEA was
extended to provide protection to employees of state and local governments. 23
In 1978, the ADEA was again amended, this time to cover federal employees
and persons age forty through sixty-nine.24 Finally, in 1986, the upper age limit
was abandoned; thus the only restriction on the Act's application is that an
individual must be forty years old to be protected.25
17See Obee & Cooper, supra note 15, at 1339-40.
18See Marie D. DiSante, Case Note, Age Discrimination in Employment -
Judicial Interpretation of the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exception, 52 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 773, 779 (Spring 1987). The Secretary of Labor found that there
"is persistent and widespread use of age limits in hiring that in a great many
cases can be attributed only to arbitrary discrimination against older workers
on the basis of age and regardless of ability." Id. See also JOSEPH E. KALET, AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 1 (1990) (indicating that the inclusion of
the request of the Secretary of Labor to study age discrimination was a
compromise between those Congressmen who had wanted a prohibition of
age discrimination included in the 1964 Civil Rights Act and those who did not
want such a provision in that piece of legislation).
19 ADEA, supra note 8, §§ 621-34.
20 Id. § 621(b).
2129 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1992). This rule resulted from the 1974 amendments to
the Act. Initially the Act affected employers with 25 or more employees. With
respect to the number of employees, the Act has been interpreted liberally and
has been construed to apply to management and supervisory employees. See
Obee & Cooper, supra note 15, at 1341 n.9.
22 ADEA, supra note 8, § 623(a)(1)-(2).
23 Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259,
§ 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 74 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982)). The ADEA was
amended in 1974 as part of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974.
2429 U.S.C. § 631(a)-(b) (1982). Prior to the amendments of 1978, the ADEA
covered persons from age forty through age sixty-four.
2 5 See The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986,





To establish a Title VII violation, a plaintiff may proceed under one of two
theories: disparate treatment or disparate impact. Disparate treatment
involves an employer's treatment of certain employees less favorably than
others because of the employee's race, religion, sex, or national origin.26 Under
§ 623(i). The 1986 Amendments removed the age ceiling for applicability of the
ADEA for all employees except executives or people in high policy-making
positions, faculty of colleges and universities, and firefighters and law
enforcement officers. An employer can force a high policy-making employee
to retire at age 65, and until 1993, institutions of higher education can retire
tenured faculty members at the age of 70. 29 U.S.C. § 631(b), (c), (d). The 1986
Amendments temporarily suspend the ADEA protections for state employed
firefighters and law enforcement officers for seven years. During this time the
EEOC and Department of Labor were to jointly study physical and mental
fitness tests to determine whether they are legitimate measurements of
competency. The provision does not apply to litigation that had begun prior
to January 1,1987, and the study is to be completed by the end of 1993.29 U.S.C.
§ 623(i).
26 Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977). In Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Court held that a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of demonstrating that "the tests in question select
applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from
that of the pool of applicants." Id. at 425. Once a prima facie case has been
established, the burden shifts to the employer to justify the practice. Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971). The employer may employ either the
business necessity defense or the job-relatedness defense. Furthermore, the
plaintiff may rebut either defense by demonstrating that "other tests or
selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve
the employer's legitimate interest in [quality production]." Albemarle, 422 U.S.
at 425. Although proof of discriminatory motive is crucial in these cases, in
some instances it may be inferred from the differences in treatment. Teamsters,
431 U.S. at 335-36.
Despite the consistent application of Griggs, the Supreme Court, with the
help of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), changed the
disparate impact analysis. The decision drastically decreased an employer's
burden in defending against a disparate impact claim. Rather than requiring
the employer to prove a business necessity for its policy, the employer was
merely required to produce evidence of a "business justification." Id. at 657.
However, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned the Wards Cove analysis and
reinstated the disparate impact burden of Griggs. The legislation provides that
one of its purposes is "to codify the concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job
related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs... and in other Supreme
Court decisions prior to Wards Cove." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L. No.
102-166, sec. 2(2), 105 Stat. 107 (1991).
The burden of proof in disparate impact cases will now work as follows:
The complaining party must demonstrate that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a statistical disparate impact on the basis of
1992]
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the disparate treatment model, a person who believes he has been
discriminated against on the basis of his age must establish a prima facie case
by showing 'blatant and overt discrimination by the employer."27 Disparate
impact, on the other hand, involves employment practices that are facially
neutral but have the effect of denying employment opportunities to members
of a protected group at a higher rate than those notbelonging to such a group. 28
The burden of establishing a prima facie case lies with the employee who
must demonstrate that: (1) he was within the statutorily protected age group;
(2) he was able and qualified for the job; (3) he was discharged or treated
adversely; and (4) the employer sought to replace him with a younger person
or gave benefits to a younger person.29 Within the context of the ADEA, a prima
facie case means that the plaintiff has to produce enough evidence to shift the
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Once this has been accomplished,
the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the challenged practice
is "job related" for the position in question and is consistent with a business
necessity. A complaining party may also show that it proposed an alternative
employment practice which would not have the same disparate impact and
that the employer refused to accept the alternative; thus, the employer would
then have theburden of demonstrating that the alternative could not have been
employed because of business necessity. Section 105(a) of the Civil Rights Act.
2 7 JOAN M. KRAUSKOPF, ADVOCACY FOR THE AGING 231 (1983).
28 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36, n.15. Proof of a discriminatory motive is not
required under this theory as it is under the disparate treatment theory. Id.
29 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). McDonnell
Douglas established this structure for employees attempting to prove disparate
treatment under Title VII. The case involved an employee who had engaged in
disruptive and illegal activities in an effort to protect his discharge. When his
employer rejected his application for re-employment, he filed a complaint with
the EEOC alleging a violation of Title VII. Id. at 794-96. The Supreme Court
established that in order to recover under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
plaintiff has the initial burden of:
[E]stablishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done
by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. Many courts have applied the McDonnell Douglas test to age
discrimination cases under the ADEA. Monte B. Lake, ADEA: A Review of the
Substantive Requirements, Age Discrimination, in EMPLOYMENT ACT: A
SYMPOSIUM HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 64
(1983). In addition, the EEOC, which is the agency charged with enforcing both
Title VII and the ADEA, has determined that it will interpret the ADEA in a
manner consistent with Title VII. Id. at 36. See also infra notes 40,50, 78, 84 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the application of the relationship




burden of production to the defendant. Consequently, the employer is required
to show that its actions were taken for legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.30
In attempting to do so, the employer may raise the following defenses: (1) that
the employment decision was based on a factor other than age; (2) that the
employment decision was authorized by the company's seniority system; or
(3) that age was a bona fide occupational qualification.31 Thus, even under the
ADEA, an employer may discharge an employee for legitimate business
reasons, provided that age is not the true underlying reason for the termination.
If the employer fails to satisfy its burden, the plaintiff will prevail.32
When implementing the ADEA, Congress realized that, in certain instances,
age would be an important factor in hiring due to the particularities and
responsibilities of the job. Thus, in instances where a person's age could be
reasonably related to her ability to perform a particular job, it may be
reasonable for an employer to refuse to hire the applicant or to terminate the
employee because of her age. Such justification by employers has become
especially prevalent in the protective services and transportation industries,33
areas in which public safety concerns are of the utmost importance. 34
III. THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION
A. Background
Congress specifically enumerated certain exceptions to the prohibition of
age-based discrimination in the ADEA. 35 Most important, for purposes of this
analysis, is the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) exception. This
30 Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
(quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). This burden is one merely of
the presentation of evidence; therefore, the employer does not have to prove
the lack of a discriminatory motive by a preponderance of the evidence. Lake,
supra note 29, at 64.
3 1 ADEA, supra note 8, § 623(0. For the relevant language of the BFOQ, see
infra note 37 and accompanying text.
32 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (if the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence,
and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter
judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains).
33 See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Meryl G.
Finkelstein, Note, Minimum Physical Standards--Safeguarding the Rights of
Protective Service Workers Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 57
FORDHAM L. REv. 1053, 1054 (1989).
34 See Finkelstein, supra note 33, at 1054-55.
35 1d.
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exception recognizes that a person's age may be related to her competence in
performing the tasks required in certain jobs.36
The ADEA provides, in relevant part.
[Tbo take any action otherwise prohibited... where age is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation is
based on reasonable factors other than age, or where such practices
involve an employee in a work place in a foreign country, and
compliance . . . would cause such employer, or a corporation
controlled by such employer to violate the laws of the country in which
such work place is located.J
7
36 Hodgson v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 728,
730 (S.D. Fla. 1972) affd Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th
Cir. 1976) (acknowledging that there must be a balance between the ideals of
the Act and the knowledge that differentiation based on age is reasonably
necessary to the operation of some businesses or to specific positions within
some businesses).
37 ADEA, supra note 8, § 623(f)(1). The ADEA also makes it lawful for an
employer:
(2) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a), (b), (c), or
(e) of this section -
(A) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system that is not intended
to evade the purposes of this Act, except that no such seniority system
shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual
specified by section 12(a) because of the age of such individual; or
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan
(i) where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual amount of
payment made or cost incurred on behalf of an older worker is no
less than that made or incurred on behalf of a younger worker,
as permissible under section 1625.10, title 29 Code of Federal
Regulations (as in effect on June 22, 1989); or
(ii) that is a voluntary early retirement incentive plan consistent with the
relevant purpose or purposes of this Act.
Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B), no such employee
benefit plan or voluntary early retirement incentive plan shall excuse the failure
to hire any individual, and no such employee benefit plan shall require or
permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 12(a),
because of the age of such individual.
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.
Id. § 623(f). Prior to the enactment of the 1990 law, there was an exemption for
employee benefit plans provided that the employer was able to establish that
the plan was lawful. Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158
(1989). However, the ADEA now covers all employee benefit plans and
establishes a minimum standard for employees who waive their rights under
the ADEA. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433,




The BFOQ defense embodies the concept of "business necessity" in that age
discrimination may be permissible if the essence of the business' operation
would be undermined by not applying the age limitation.38 To establish a
BFOQ, a factual foundation is necessary; a bare assertion that older people are
unable to satisfactorily perform the job is not enough since the ADEA does not
permit employment discrimination based upon stereotyped characteristics
concerning age.39
B. The Legislature Intended that the ADEA be Interpreted Broadly and that the
BFOQ be Interpreted Narrowly
Based on an extensive set of congressional findings dealing with the adverse
effects of arbitrary discrimination in employment,40 the ADEA states that its
purpose is to "promote employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; and
to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from
the impact of age on employment."41 Almost all legislative statements
regarding the goals and ideals of the ADEA encompass the idea that an
individual should be judged on her capabilities rather than on broad
stereotypes. 42 For example, the House Report for the 1977 amendments states
that the"decline of capabilities experienced with age... varies with individuals
as to age and intensity, varies in importance to particular jobs, and may be
compensated for by other attributes which often increase with age, for example,
experience and judgment.' 43 The emphasis is on consideration of each
individual and her job.
In 1978 Congress amended the ADEA, reaffirming its mandate that
employment decisions should be based on individual assessments and clarify-
38 ADEA, supra note 8, § 623(f)(1). The ADEA's BFOQ exception closely
parallels the BFOQ defense under Title VII. The major difference between the
two is the substitution for the word "age" in the former, for the words "religion,
sex, or national origin" in the latter. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1990) (ADEA
version) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1989) (Title VII version). The similarities
between the two are purposeful. Title VII was the model for the ADEA and
many of the ADEA's provisions were "derived in haec verba" from it. Lorillard,
Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,584 (1978).
39 LEE M. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 393-95 (2d ed.
1988).
40 See ADEA, supra note 13, § 621(a).
41 ADEA, supra note 8, § 621(b).
42 Robert L. Fischman, Note, The BFOQ Defense in ADEA Suits: The Scope of
"Duties of the Job", 85 MICH. L. REV. 330,342 (1986).
43 H.R. REP. No. 527, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1. at 12 (1977); See Fischman,
supra note 42, at 342.
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ing the BFOQ exception. 44 In discussing the BFOQ exception, the House stated
that "the committee ... expects that age will be a relevant factor for only a
limited number of jobs."45 In conforming to and maintaining Congressional
intent, a court must consider only the job responsibilities of the individual
rather than examining the job characteristics of the business or occupation.46
Just as the ADEA uses the "reasonably necessary" language, a narrow
construction of the BFOQ finds further support in the analogous statutory
language of the ADEA contained in Title VII, which also uses the words
"reasonably necessary."4 7 Both the Department of Labor (DOL) and the EEOC
interpretations assert that the BFOQ defense is to be narrowly construed and
have limited scope and application.4 8 Indeed, a broad application of the BFOQ
would endanger the ADEA.
In interpreting the ADEA, courts have emphasized that it is a remedial
statute which prohibits a "subtle form of discrimination" and have concluded
that Congress intended it be given broad scope.4 9 In Western Airlines, Inc. v.
Criswell,50 the Supreme Court summarized the language and legislative
history of the ADEA and observed that "one empirical fact is repeatedly
44See generally S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1977). Congress
wanted to insure that older individuals who wanted to work would not be
precluded from doing so solely on the basis of age.
45 H.R. REP. No. 527, supra note 43, at 12.
46 Fischman, supra note 42, at 341.
4742 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1964). Title VII provides in part:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees.., on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in
that certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise ....
Id.
4829 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1976) (the DOL's definition of the BFOQ defense);
29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(a) (1988) (the EEOC's interpretation of the BFOQ defense);
See also Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985) (after
considering the language, Congressional intent, and interpretive guidelines
issued by administrative agencies, the Court concluded that "like its Title VII
counterpart, the BFOQ exception was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow
exception to the general prohibition of age discrimination contained in the
ADEA").
49 Raper, supra note 11, at 551. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 436 F. Supp.
505,509 (D. Minn. 1977) (stating that given the fact that the ADEA is a remedial
statute which prohibits a particularly subtle form of discrimination, the courts
must be aware of its goals and act in accordance with them).
50472 U.S. 400 (1985). For a complete discussion of the facts surrounding




emphasized: the process of psychological and physiological degeneration
caused by aging... 'has established that there is a wide range of individual
physical ability regardless of age'." 51 The Court noted that the legislative
history of the ADEA indicates that "like its Title VII counterpart, the BFOQ
exception 'was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general
prohibition of age discrimination contained in the ADEA'." 52
In addition, Criswell cites a Senate Report describing the BFOQ defense:
[Iln certain types of particularly arduous law enforcement activity,
there may be a factual basis for believing that substantially all
employees above a specified age would be unable to continue to
perform safely and efficiently the duties of their particular jobs, and it
may be impossible or impractical to determine through.. . periodic
reviews of current job performance ... the employee's capability or
ability to continue to perform... safely ....
Congress emphasized that the decision to retire should be "an individual
option" and that where a person is physically or psychologically able to
continue working, she should not be dismissed on the basis of unsupported
misconceptions concerning the effects that aging have on ability.54 This
suggests that Congress intended courts to analyze an employee's particular job
duties under the BFOQ defense.
C. EEOC's Interpretation of the BFOQ Defense Under Title VII
Originally, the Secretary of Labor had responsibility for administration,
investigation, and enforcement of the ADEA. 55 On July 1, 1978, pursuant to
President Carter's plan to consolidate the federal government's equal
employment enforcement effort, those functions were transferred to the
51472 U.S. at 409. The Court emphasized that many older workers perform
at levels equal to or superior to the level of their counterparts. Id.
52 Id. at 412.
53 Id. at 415 (citing S. Rep. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504,513-14).
54 Consequently, employers must be cognizant of the requirements of
individual jobs when invoking the BFOQ exception, otherwise, it will be so
broadly applied that it will contravene the authority requiring a narrow
interpretation. See generally Charles J. Ryan, Jr., Comment, The Scope ofthe Bona
Fide Occupational Qualification Exemption Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: EEOC v. City of Janesville, 57 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1145 (1981).
5529 U.S.C. §§ 625-26 (1976). Section 626(6) states that the Secretary, as a
prerequisite to bringing suit, must attempt to eliminate the alleged
discriminatory practice and must attempt to "effect voluntary compliance...
through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion." 29
U.S.C. § 626(6) (1976).
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EEOC.5 6 When it took over responsibility for enforcing the ADEA in 1981, the
EEOC determined that the BFOQ should be interpreted narrowly. The EEOC
stated that "[i]t is anticipated that this concept of a bona fide occupational
qualification will have limited scope and application. Further, as this is an
exception to the Act it must be narrowly construed."57 According to EEOC
guidelines, the BFOQ defense does not encompass the refusal to hire an
individual because of stereotyped characterizations 58 or an effort to cater to
client preferences. 59 The guidelines expressly determine the need for a BFOQ
in hiring only where "necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness
... e.g., an actor or actress."60
In accordance with this mandate, the EEOC has recently issued guidelines
to its investigative staff. These guidelines were issued in the wake of the
Supreme Court's unanimous decision in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.61 They
state, in pertinent part, that "policies that exclude members of one sex from a
workplace for the purpose of protecting fetuses cannot be justified under Title
VII."62As a result, individuals who can perform the essential functions of a job
must be considered eligible for employment.
56 Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978,43 Fed. Reg. 19807, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at
1366 (1988), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
5729 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1985).
58 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii)
(1985).
5929 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii).
60 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2).
61111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). For a complete discussion of the case, see infra text
accompanying notes 118-29.
62 EEOC Policy Guidance on Supreme Court's Johnson Controls Decision,
BUREAU NAT'L AFF. DAILY LAB. REP., July 10,1991, at E-1. (BNA) No. 132 at E-1
(July 10, 1991). The commission identifies such policies as those that exclude
all women, all women of childbearing capacity, all women of childbearing age,
or all pregnant women from worksites containing potential hazards to
developing fetuses. Moreover, once an allegation has been confirmed that a
fetal protection policy excludes women, the Commission advises that a
violation of Title VII be found, as is evidenced by the following:
It does not matter whether the employer can prove that a substance to which
its workers are exposed will endanger the health of a fetus. It also does not
matter whether the employer can prove that it will incur a higher cost as a
result of hiring women. Individuals who can perform the essential func-
tions of a job must be considered eligible for employment, regardless of the





Various courts have adopted the EEOC's position that the BFOQ should be
strictly construed. In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.,63 the
defendant based his rejection of a female applicant, for the position of
switchman, on the BFOQ defense that women were unqualified to perform a
switchman's physically demanding responsibilities. 64 The court noted that the
EEOC had interpreted the BFOQ exemption narrowly, rejected the defense, and
held that Southern Bell failed to prove it had "reasonable cause to believe...
that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and
efficiently the duties of the job involved."65
A second major decision supporting the EEOC's interpretation was Bowe v.
Colgate Palmolive Co. 66 In Bowe, a Title VII case, federal employees challenged
an employer's practice of restricting women from jobs that required lifting
weight in excess of 35 pounds.67 The court rejected the defendant's assertion
that this policy constituted a legitimate BFOQ.68 Rather than rely on Weeks' "all
or substantially all" test,69 the Bowe court cited the EEOC guidelines focusing
on an individual's ability to perform a job and held that the employer must
provide a reasonable opportunity for each employee to demonstrate his or her
ability to lift 35 pounds.70
Although EEOC guidelines do not have the force of law, courts generally
give them considerable weight. Both Weeks and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 71 a
Title VII case, acknowledged that the administrative interpretation of a statute
63408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
64 Id. at 234.
65 Id. at 235. Weeks established that an employer must show either that it had
a reasonable cause for believing that "all or substantially all" of the members
of the classified group would be unable to perform the job safely and efficiently
or that it would be impossible or very impractical to deal with the class
members on an individual basis. Id.
66416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
67 1d. at 715.
68Id. at 718.
69 Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235.
70 Bowe, 416 F.2d at 718. The Court stated that the company could retain the
35 pound requirement, but that it must be applied equally to men and women.
Id.
71401 U.S. 424 (1971). For a complete discussion of Griggs, see infra note 109
and accompanying text.
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by its enforcing agency is entitled to "great deference."72 In recent years
however, the Supreme Court has determined that, under certain circumstances,
the EEOC guidelines will be accorded limited "persuasive value."73 In EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., the EEOC guidelines were considerd to be of minimal value
in interpreting Title VII's application to citizens outside the United States. 74
The Court in Arabian based its decision on its holding in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, where it addressed the issue of the appropriate weight to be given
EEOC guidelines. In recognizing that "Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not
confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations," 75 the
Court determined that the degree of deference afforded "will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.' 76 In its decision the
Court looked to certain indicia which included the fact that the EEOC
guidelines were pronounced eight years after Title VII's enactment, their
position conflicted with earlier interpretations, and the plain meaning of the
statute did not support their interpretation. 77
72 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34. The Court held that '[t]he administrative
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference.
Since the Act and its legislative history support the Commission's construction,
this affords good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of
Congress." Id.
One should realize however, that this does not mean that the guidelines
must be followed in every situation. At least one court has stated that they
should be followed absent a showing that some cogent reason exists for
noncompliance, but that they are not strictly binding on the courts. See United
States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973). Similarly, another
court has determined that "[a]lthough the EEOC's pronouncement does not
have the effect of law, ... it is entitled to a measure of deference unless 'it can
be said not to be a reasoned and supportable interpretation' of the Act." EEOC
v. Texas Indus., 782 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Whirlpool Corp. v.
Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980)).
73 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1235 (1991); See General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
74 111 S. Ct. at 1228.
75429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976).





D. Judicial Interpretations Under Title VII and the ADEA
1. Overview of Cases
Despite differences between the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, courts frequently follow Title VII precedent and procedures when faced
with age discrimination cases.78 This is due in part to the striking similarity
between the wording of the ADEA BFOQ exemption and that of the Title VII
BFOQ exemption.79 It has become accepted that once an employee makes
chronological age differentials in the workplace, the birden of proof is on the
employer to demonstrate that its actions were within the scope of the BFOQ
exemption; however, the courts have applied different legal standards and
reached different results with respect to what constitutes a legitimate BFOQ.80
Therehas emerged ajudicial reluctance to second guess employer judgments
with respect to employment policies when the costs of an erroneous selection
decision are likely to affect not only employer profits, but also the interests of
third parties.81 An example of such a third party is the general public. Courts
will often defer to employers' policies because there is a notion that employers
will utilize policies that place the general public's safety first.
The judicial caution underlying this concern is found in Spurlock v. United
Airlines, Inc.82 which relied on a "variable business necessity approach. 83 This
Title VII race discrimination case involved a challenge to pre-employment test
requirements for entry into a flight officer training program.84 In applying the
78 See supra notes 14, 15, 17, 29, 40, 50, infra notes 78, 84 and accompanying
text for a discussion on the relationship between Title VII and the ADEA.
79 See supra note 40. The legislative histories of the two statutes, along with
the EEOC, illustrate that the ADEA be interpreted consistently with Title VII.
See Lake, supra note 29, at 43. However, the "adoption of all Title VII law would
be inappropriate because age is a progressive factor which all individuals must
eventually face." Lake, supra note 29, at 61 n.162.
8 )See Obee & Cooper, supra note 15, at 1348; Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that an employer's job qualifications
must be shown to be "reasonably necessary" to the essence of the business, and
that the employer must demonstrate that job applicants over a certain age are
incapable of meeting its qualifications); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499
F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that an employer must simply have articulated
a factual basis for believing that elimination of its maximum hiring age would
increase the potential of harm to its passengers).
81 SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL HARPER, CASES & MATERIALS ON THE LAW
GOVERNING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 741 (1990).
82475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972).
83 ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 81 at 741.
84Spurlock, 475 F.2d at 217. Plaintiff, Spurlock, challenged United Airline's
requirement that an applicant meet certain minimum standards such as 500
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business necessity doctrine,8 5the court distinguished jobs requiring a small
amount of skill and training where the consequences of hiring unqualified
applicants are insignificant, from jobs requiring a high degree of skill, where
the economic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant are
great.86 The court pointed out that the airline's flight officers piloted aircraft
worth as much as $20 million and transported as many as 300 passengers per
flight.87 Therefore, it was clearly in the public interest to have the most qualified
people available to pilot airliners.
In addition, the court warned that subsequent decisions requiring an
employer to lower his pre-employment standards for such jobs should be made
with the greatest of caution.88 "An industry with the primary function of
managing the safety of large numbers of passengers must be allowed more
hours of flight time, a commercial pilot's license and instrument rating, and a
college degree. He argued that these requirements had a disparate impact on
minorities.
85 Id. at 219. In situations involving a facially neutral employment practice,
the courts have developed a rule that such a practice can continue despite its
discriminatory impact if it can be justified by a business necessity; that is, a
legitimate, nonracial business reason for the practice. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
This is distinguishable from the BFOQ in that it is court-developed,
applicable to facially neutral employment practices, and is applicable to racial
discrimination. The BFOQ exception is an affirmative defense that is statutory,
applicable to overtly discriminatory employment practices, and is not
applicable to racial discrimination. Further, the business justification focuses
on the appropriateness of job qualifications rather than on the legitimacy of an
automatic exclusion of members of a particular class, and results in a lower
threshold for establishing business necessity. See Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ
Revisited: Johnson Controls Halts the Expansion of the Defense to Intentional Sex
Discrimination, 52 OHIo ST. L. J. 5, 10 (1991).
Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the two theories were
also distinguishable in that the burden of proving a BFOQ fell upon the
employer, whereas under the business necessity doctrine, the employer merely
had a burden of production of evidence. Compare Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989) (concluding that when an employer asserts that gender is a
BFOQ, the Court will hold that employer responsible for showing why "it must
use gender as a criterion in employment") with Wards Cove Packaging v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that the plaintiff has the burden of
persuasion in disparte impact cases). Thus, in disparate impact cases the
plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion. For a discussion of the burdens of
proof currently employed, see supra note 26.






latitude in structuring the requirements which could effect the performance of
a primary business objective."89
On the other hand, where safety considerations are negligible, employment
standards are much less demanding.90 For example, prerequisites of sales
experience and sales motivation for entry into a securities sales representative
training program failed to satisfy the business necessity standard.91
One case relying upon safety considerations when determining the
requirements for establishing a BFOQ defense was Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc.,92 where a bus company had a policy of refusing to hire new drivers who
were 35 years of age or older.93 Greyhound attempted to justify its policy by
claiming that age was a BFOQ and fell within the ADEA exemptions. 94 In so
doing, Greyhound asserted that hiring persons over 35 did not provide enough
time for the employees to train and gain experience as safe drivers. 95 As a result,
the incomplete training, coupled with the deterioration of abilities that occur
with age, would seriously undermine passenger safety.96
The Hodgson Court held that the "essence" of Greyhound's business was the
safe transportation of passengers and that an employer need prove only that
"it has a rational basis in fact to believe that elimination" of the hiring policy
based on age might endanger the life of just one more person than might
otherwise occur.97 In so doing, it reversed the district court's finding that the
89 Chrisner v. Complete Auto Trans., Inc., 645 F.2d 1251,1262 (6th Cir. 1981)
(citing the Tenth Circuit's decision in Spurlock). This Title VII sex discrimination
case involved the failure to hire plaintiff, a female applicant, as a yard
employee, because she did not have the required two years truck driving
experience and/or had not completed truck driving school. Id. at 1255. The
court held, in pertinent part, that the "interest in safety on the roads and
highways is sufficiently weighty to warrant finding that [the] experience
requirement . . . manifestly related to safe and efficient operation of
[transporting automobiles] over the public highways [and constituted a
business necessity defense]." Id. at 1263 (citations omitted).
90 Id. at 1262.
91 Id.
92499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nor. Brennan v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
93 Greyhound, 499 F.2d at 863.
94 d.
95 d.
96 d. at 863-65.
97499 F.2d at 863.
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BFOQ defense was not applicable and adopted the test set forth in Diaz v. Pan
American World Airline, Inc.,98 also a Title VII action.
Diaz involved the challenge to an airline's practice of restricting cabin
attendant positions to women.99 In an attempt to justify its policy, the
defendant argued that the employment policy constituted a BFOQ because
women were better qualified to serve the special psychological needs of its
customers and the customers preferred women attendants.100 The court
rejected the foregoing arguments and opined that "discrimination based on sex
is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be undermined
by not hiring members of one sex exclusively."101 The Diaz test requires an
employer to prove that hiring those within the excepted class would be
detrimental to the "essence" of the business operation, e.g. the safe
transportation of passengers.102
In Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,1 3 the Fifth Circuit established a
two-pronged test104 for determining the validity of a BFOQ defense. In Usery,
an unsuccessful applicant challenged Tamiami's maximum hiring age of forty
for intercity bus drivers.10 5 The Tamiami courtbased its analysis on the holdings
in Diazl06 and Weeksl 07 when it concluded that a safety-related job qualification
would establish a BFOQ when an employer demonstrates that:
1. Under Diaz, the qualification must be reasonably necessary to the
essence of the employer's business; and
2. Under Weeks, there must be a factual basis for believing either
a. that all or substantially all persons over the specified age
possess characteristics precluding safe or efficient
performance of the duties of the job involved, or
98442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
99 Id. at 386.
100M., at 387.
101 Id. at 388.
1021d.
103 The employer must satisfy its burden under both prongs. Reaching the
second prong depends upon the employer's ability to satisfy his burden under
the first.
104531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
105 Id. at 226.
106Diaz, 442 F.2d at 385. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.




b. that individualized assessments of the members of the
designated class would be impossible or highly impractical.
108
Thus, Diaz acts in conjunction with Weeks in that before an employer can
assert that employees of a certain age do not possess the ability to perform
certain functions, it must be shown that those functions are essential to the
employer's business.
Moreover, in following Griggs"109 holding that an employer can justify a
facially neutral employment policy if it is "a business necessity" or "job related",
the district court in Tamiami narrowed the exception. The court noted that the
"touchstone for a BFOQ exemption ... is a finding that age is a reasonable
requirement necessitated by normal business operations and having a manifest
relationship to the employment in question." In light of this, at least one
commentator has argued that the Fifth Circuit believed that the court in
Greyhound had misconstrued the applicable test for establishing a BFOQ when
it neglected to acknowledge the Weeks aspect of the test.110
In Arritt v. Grisell,111 the plaintiff applied for a job as a police officer but was
denied. The sole reason for the denial was that he was 40 years old and
ineligible to take the physical and mental examinations required by law. The
law established an 18-35 year age limit for the initial appointment to the
position of police officer.11 2 The trial court applied the Greyhound test,
113
108Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 236.
109401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, the Court found that an employer's
combined use of a diploma requirement and aptitude test was illegal under
Title VII. The Court concluded that the requirements were arbitrary and
constituted a barrier to employment because they discriminate on the basis of
race. In addition, several terms were used from which one can infer that the
court envisioned some sort of business justification defense. The Court used
phrases such as "business necessity", "related to job performance", and
"manifest relationship to the employment in question". Id. at 431-32. Courts
have treated the BFOQ defense in such a manner as to adopt the job-related
business necessity standard and have used this standard to resolve BFOQ
questions. James A. Drexler, Note, Fair Employment Practices: The Concept of
Business Necessity, 3 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 76, 87-88 (1972). However, UAW
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) clearly differentiates the BFOQ
defense and the business necessity defense. See infra notes 125-27 and
accompanying text.
110 Raper, supra note 11, at 561. The Seventh Circuit in Greyhound concluded
that the Weeks and Diaz tests were inconsistent. Greyhound, 491 F.2d at 861-62.
111567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 1271. The Greyhound test articulates that the employer merely had
to show a minimal increase in the possible harm that might be caused by the
elimination of the hiring policy. Id.
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however the court of appeals reversed and remanded holding that the proper
test was the two-pronged Tamiami analysis.114
To compound the confusion, in Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept.,115 the
Seventh Circuit held that Greyhound was the correct analysis. In so doing, it
interpreted Greyhound to mean that in order to prevail on a BFOQ defense, an
employer must show that the challenged policy is reasonably related to the
"essential operation" of the business and that there is either a factual basis for
believing that all or most of the people above the age limit would be unable to
perform the required duties of the job or that it was impossible or highly
impractical to determine on an individual basis which employees would be
able to perform.116 This approach has also been adopted by the Supreme Court
in Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell,117 which appears to be the accepted
standard.
The highly publicized Supreme Court decision in UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc.118 reaffirmed the assertion that the BFOQ defense is an extremely narrow
exception to Title VII's bar against discrimination in the workplace. Johnson
Controls arose out of a class action challenging a battery manufacturer's policy
of excluding women of presumed childbearing age from jobs involving
exposure to excessive levels of lead.119 The District Court granted summary
judgment for Johnson Controls and the Seventh Circuit, en banc, affirmed. The
Seventh Circuit based its decision upon the finding that the plaintiffs had
"'failed to establish that there is an acceptable alternative policy which would
protect the fetus'" and thus the company's policy constituted a business
necessity.120
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fetal protection policy was
facially discriminatory against women because fertile men, but not fertile
women, could choose whether they wished to risk their reproductive health
for a particular job.12 1 In making the capability of bearing children the criterion
for exclusion, "Johnson Controls explicitly classified[d] on the basis of potential
for pregnancy;" such classifications are within the realm of explicit sex
1141d.
115697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
116Id. at 753.
117 See 472 U.S. 400 (1985). See infra notes 247-61 for a complete discussion of
Criswell.
118111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
119 d. Johnson Controls asserted as their reason for this policy to protect
pregnant women and their unborn children. Id. at 1197-99. The plaintiffs
alleged that the policy constituted sex discrimination under Title VII. Id. at
1197.
12 01d. at 1200.




discrimination. 122 In light of the foregoing, the Court ruled that such treatment
could only be justified by a BFOQ defense. Accordingly, the business necessity
test used by the Seventh Circuit was deemed inapplicable. 123
After deciding that the policy was facially discriminatory the Court
considered whether the policy came within the BFOQ exception. Johnson
Controls argued that its policy fell within the safety exception of the BFOQ
under which third party safety concerns may justify a discriminatory policy.124
The majority rejected this assertion and endorsed the traditional view that a
BFOQ defense "is limited to instances in which sex or pregnancy actually
interferes with the employee's ability to perform the job."125
The Court stated that the third-party concerns raised by the company did
not relate to either the female employees' ability to perform the job or to the
essence of the business.126 In accordance with the first prong of the Tamiami
test, the majority described the "essence" of Johnson Control's business as
"batterymaking" and stated that the company's concern for the welfare of
future children is not part of the "essence" of its business. 127
The Court's opinion also endorsed the strict interpretation of Tamiami's
second prong, the "all or substantially all" test. Johnson Controls argued that it
had to exclude all fertile women in that it is impossible to tell which women
will become pregnant while working with lead.128 The Court however,
concluded that the company's "fear of prenatal injury, no matter how sincere,
12 2 Id. at 1203. Although not explicitly stated, Johnson Control's
discriminatory policy amounts to disparate treatment discrimination. This
conclusion may be inferred from the scope of the opinion. First, the majority
finds facial discrimination and immediately proceeds to the BFOQ issue.
Second, none of the opinions suggest the potential use of the alternative
business necessity approach.
1231d. at 1204. This is evidenced by the fact that the Court placed the burden
of proof on the employer to establish the existance of a BFOQ. Id. A BFOQ
analysis would have been rejected if the Court had followed the Wards Cove
analysis and placed the burden of proving a business necessity on the plaintiff.
124 d. at 1205.
125 d. at 1205-07. The Court's argument was supported by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)), which
concludes that, with respect to Title VII, discrimination based on pregnancy is
explicit sex discrimination. Id. at 1203.
126johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1207-08. This is in contrast to Criswell, where
the safety concerns were central to the purpose of the employer's business, that
being the safe transportation of passengers.
127 1d. at 1207. The opinion also states that "[diecisions about the welfare of
future children must be left to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and
raise them rather than to the employers who hire their parents."
128Id. at 1208.
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does not begin to show that substantially all of its fertile women employees are
incapable of doing their jobs."1 29
As a result of Johnson Controls, employment policies that exclude members
of one sex from the workplace in order to protect fetuses cannot be justified
under Title VII. It is irrelevant whether the employer can prove that a substance
to which its workers are exposed will endanger the health of a fetus. Nor does
it matter whether the employer can prove that higher costs will be incurred as
a result of hiring women. All individuals who are able to perform the essential
functions of ajob must be considered eligible for employment regardless of the
presence of hazards to fetuses.
Thus, the judiciary that began interpreting the concept of "business
necessity" under the fairly lenient standard of Griggs has formulated an
analogous, yet more stringent standard for the BFOQ exception under Criswell
and more recently under Johnson Controls.
2. Summary of Tests
Courts have developed two tests for determining whether an employer's
BFOQ defense is valid under the provisions of the ADEA. The first, the
Greyhound-Diaz-Spurlock test, has generated much criticism.130 Under this test,
an employer will meet its burden of establishing BFOQ defense if it can show
that a "minimal increase in the risk of harm" will occur if the employment policy
is eliminated. 131
In making public safety the focus of its decision, the Greyhound court
unequivocally rejected Weeks because it did not have a public safety
component.132 This conclusion, however, may be erroneous in that it is a
misinterpretation of the two cases.133 With its business essence requirement,
Diaz acts in conjunction with Weeks by initially eliminating any BFOQ claim
where the employer cannot establish that the job qualifications in question are
related to the essence of the employer's business.134Although Greyhound
129 Id. at 1208. However, the Court acknowledged that the "all or substantially
all" element of the BFOQ "is somewhat academic in light of our conclusion that
the company may not exclude fertile women at all." Id.
130 See generally Irving Kovarsky & Dr. Joel Kovarsky, Economic, Medical and
Legal Aspects of the Age Discrimination Laws in Employment, 27 VAND. L. REV. 839,
894-901 (1974).
13 1 Greyhound, 499 F.2d at 863.
132 0Obee & Cooper, supra note 15, at 1355.
133 Raper, supra note 11, at 561.
134 Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 235 & n.27. In rejecting the conclusion that the Diaz
and Weeks tests were inconsistent, the Fifth Circuit noted that:
[T]he Diaz requirement of a correlation between the job description and the
essence of the business operation is a condition precedent to the application




demonstrated that its job qualifications were reasonable and necessary to the
safe transportion of passengers, the inquiry should have been taken one step
further. Without proving that older workers in general would be unable to meet
their job requirements, little has been established. It has been suggested that
Greyhound's reliance upon Diaz was merely an attempt to sidestep Weeks. 135
In realizing that Diaz alone would be insufficient to justify Greyhound's
hiring policy, the defense relied on Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc.136 As noted
previously, the court in Spurlock found that when a job involves a high degree
of skill and risk of injury, an employer carries a lesser burden when justifying
its pre-employment standards. Greyhound focused more on the risk factor and
did not attempt to demonstrate that the duties of a bus driver involved a high
degree of skill.13 7
One must also realize that the Spurlock test is not as stringent as Greyhound;
Spurlock does not exclude all members of a protected group nor does it totally
disregard individual ability.138 Although Greyhound was able to demonstrate
that its job qualifications were related to the essence of the employer's business,
it did not demonstrate that older workers in general would be unable to meet
the job requirements.139 Consequently, the Greyhound test results in the total
exclusion of the protected class with no flexibility allowed for individual
testing.
The second test, the Tamiami-Weeks test, is more deeply rooted in Title VII
precedent than is Greyhound. However, it too has been subjected to criticism in
that, like Greyhound, it eliminates an entire protected class from emplolyment
consideration. 140 This test posits that an employer meets its burden if it can
Diaz affirms and elaborates on the Weeks rationale... [Diaz] represented to
discriminate on the basis of job description not related to the essence of the
employer's business.
135 See Obee & Cooper, supra note 15, at 1355.
136 See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
137 Greyhound, 499 F.2d at 864.
138 0bee & Cooper, supra note 15, at 1356.
139 Greyhound, 499 F.2d at 863-64.
14 0 0bee & Cooper, supra note 15, at 1356. This facet of the test has been
criticized in that, while Tamiami appears to follow Weeks, it has "violated Weeks'
spirit by shifting the focus from the individual measurement of the person to
the employer's determination of how much effort, time, and money would be
expended in the selection process." Id. The "all or substantially all" portion of
the Weeks test is concerned with the capabilities of the applicants. Yet in
footnote five of the Weeks decision, the court refuses to acknowledge the
particular characteristics of protected individuals in an attempt to reconcile its
holding with that of the Bowe court. Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235. The court in Bowe
upheld a discriminatory policy because of the employer's highly complicated
seniority system which would have had to undergo comprehensive revisions
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demonstrate the impossibility and impracticality of testing older applicants to
determine which individuals would pose a minimal risk or no risk at all if hired.
Read in conjunction, if a test existed which could determine on an
individualized basis, an older worker's capabilities in performing a particular
job, then Greyhound and Tamiami would be satisfied.141 The primary difficulty
lies in the conflict between those who assert that the functional age of an
individual, that is, her ability and capacity to perform a job, can be determined
by medical testing, and those who assert that medical testing cannot detect
functional age or the degenerative physical changes brought about by the aging
process. 14 2
IV. THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFCATION IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
A. Airlines and the Impact of Safety Considerations
The transportation industry is unique in that, unlike many employers,
thousands of people depend on it daily for safe and efficient travel. In
particular, the airline industry's success depends on passengers' continued
assumption that flying is one of the safest forms of transportation. If passengers
are unsure of the safety of air travel, they might choose another means of
reaching their destination. Consequently, like the bus company in Greyhound,
safety is of the utmost concern for the airline industry.
The Federal Aviation Act143 states that "[iun prescribing standards, rules, and
regulations, and in issuing certificates under this subchapter, the Secretary of
if women were allowed to transfer into the heavy lifting classifications.
However, the court did reject the lifting requirement itself as a valid BFOQ.
Bowe, 416 F.2d at 718. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text. Thus, it is
enigmatic that the Bowe holding, which was to form the basis for the Weeks
court's footnote five and the holding in Tamiami was reversed by the Seventh
Circuit.
This test has also been criticized in Tamiami when the court noted that great
deference should be shown to the reasonable safety standards set by
employers, no matter how stringent they may be. Thus, once an employer
demonstrates that safe transportation is the essence of its business, the court
will lower the employer's burden when proving that its policies are necessary
to insure safety. This reduced scrutiny poses a potential danger in that an
employer may set strict qualifications so as to eliminate the entire class of older
workers from employment. Obee & Cooper, supra note 15, at 1356.
14 1 0bee & Cooper, supra note 15, at 1357-58. This would eliminate from
consideration those applicants who posed a minimum risk, thus allowing
applicants who posed no risk to be hired. In promulgating such a test, much
disagreement which exists between the courts would be eliminated.
1421d. at 1358. See, e.g., Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 237-38; Greyhound, 499 F.2d at
863-64.




Transportation shall give full consideration to the duty resting upon air carriers
to perform their services with the highest possible degree of safety in the public
interest .... 144 Thus, Congress has recognized that the airline industry must
operate with the highest possible degree of care. Because of the large number
of people presently participating in air travel and the losses that would be
incurred in the event of an accident, airlines must be meticulous in all tasks
pertinent to passenger safety. It is possible that the airlines themselves are in
the best position to determine what policies should be implemented to attain
the highest level of safety. Consequently, at least one court has concluded that
great deference should be given to an airline's determination of the safest
possible standards for operation.145
With the establishment of the BFOQ, Congress recognized that, in certain
instances, safety considerations which result in discrimination may outweigh
an employee's challenge to the discriminatory practice. 146 For example, if the
essence of the business' normal operation involves public safety, and if the
employer's restriction on age is the only means by which to further these goals,
then the employer may establish a BFOQ.147
Similarly the Department of Labor has implemented various regulations
regarding the utilization of the BFOQ exception. The Labor Department has
stated that:
[A] BFOQ defense permits federal statutory and regulatory
compulsory retirement provisions imposed to protect public safety
without reference to the individual's ability to perform the job.148
144Id.
145 See Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1770 (1982). The Court noted that "the airline industry is
one in which safety is of the utmost importance," and the "staggering death
tolls and resulting human suffering which have followed some of our nation's
horrible air disasters attest to this fact." Id. at 101. It further held that "the'safest'
possible air transportation is the ultimate goal. Courts, in our view, do not
possess the expertise with which, in a cause presenting safety as the critical
element, to supplant their judgments for those of the employer." Id. at 101.
146 See Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 235 (an employer's burden may be met if it
establishes that some members of the otherwise protected class "possess a trait
precluding safe and efficient job performance that cannot be ascertained by
means other than knowledge of the applicant's membership in the class").
147 See Raper, supra note 11, at 565, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1625 (1988). Section 1625
notes that "[i]f the employer's objective in asserting a BFOQ is the goal of public
safety, the employer must prove that the challenged practice does indeed
effectuate that goal and that there is no acceptable alternative which would
better advance it or equally advance it with less discriminatory impact." Id.
§ 1625.6(b).
148Johnson, 745 F.2d at 993, citing 29 C.F.R. 860.102(d) (1983) ("[tlhe BFOQ
regulation recognizes that the BFOQ defense permits federal statutory and
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[Thus,] the government body responsible for interpreting the ADEA
recognizes that a BFOQ defense does not have to relate solely to the
employee's age and ability to perform the job assigned. 149
Therefore, public safety is recognized as a concern which may justify the
application of the BFOQ defense to a claim of age discrimination.
In establishing a BFOQ defense based upon safety concerns, an employer
must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in Tamiami.1501t appears that this
standard tracks Title VII precedent in which policies having a disparate impact
must be justified by a showing of business necessity.151
regulatory compulsory retirement provisions imposed to protect public safety
without reference to the individual's ability to perform the job").
149 Johnson, 745 F.2d at 993.
15OCriswell, 472 U.S. at 416. The Court held that '[elvery Court of Appeals
that has confronted a BFOQ defense based on safety considerations has
analyzed the problem consistently with the Tamiami standard." Id. For a
discussion of the two-prong test, see supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
In addition, the Court found that.
An EEOC regulation embraces the same criteria. Considering the narrow
language of the BFOQ exception, the parallel treatment of such questions
under Title VII, and the uniform application of the standard by the federal
courts, the EEOC, and Congress, we conclude that this two-part inquiry
properly identifies the relevant considerations for resolving a BFOQ
defense to an age-based qualification purportedly justified by considera-
tions of safety.
Id. at 416-17.
151 Although some courts tend to group together the BFOQ and business
necessity tests, Johnson Controls believed that they ought to be treated distinctly.
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). See also Wilson v.
Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981); EEOC v. Marathon
County, 26 FEP Cases 1736 (W.D. Wisc. 1981); BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 292 (1976). The business
necessity defense only comes into play where an employment practice is
facially neutral but has a discriminatory impact. For a discussion of the
business necessity defense, see supra note 85.
At least one author has noted that in adopting the business necessity test of
Title VII, the EEOC's guidelines (§ 1625.6(b)) misallocate the burden of proving
business necessity by placing it on the employers. Lake, supra note 29 at 42. In
the past, the burden of proving the final element of the business necessity test,
the availability of less discriminatory practices, properly rested with the
plaintiff. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,329 (1977); Albermarle Paper Co.




B. The Federal Aviation Administration's Age Sixty Rule
The Federal Aviation Administration has promulgated a regulation that is
commonly referred to as the "Age Sixty Rule."152 This rule provides that "when
an individual has reached his sixtieth birthday [he] may not serve as a pilot of
an aircraft engaged in air carrier operations under Part 121 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations. 153 [This] rule [however], does not prohibit pilots from
serving in other capacities within the airlines, ... such as flight instructor.154
The Age Sixty Rule was adopted on December 1, 1959 "to promote aviation
safety and in recognition of the statutory duty of air carriers to provide the
highest levels of safety."155
The very nature of this rule has caused it to be the subject of frequent scrutiny
and litigation.156 However, "in each challenge, the [a]gency has been
upheld."157 In 1979 Congress "carefully examined the basis for the rule and in
light of its concern that safety could be compromised by its amendment, it left
the rule [in tact]." 158 Further, a study conducted by the National Institute on
Aging (hereinafter, NIA) was ordered to determine whether there was a
continued need for the rule.159 The 1980 study found "no feasible alternatives
to the rule." It determined that the physical and psychological effects of aging
adversely affected an individuals ability to perform at the highestlevel of safety
and thus necessitated a policy of across the board age discrimination. 160
In 1984, the FAA and the Federal Air Surgeon [determined] after
[extensive] review, that there are simply no medical or performance
tests which afford a [sufficient] reliable [means] for predicting ... pilot
152 For a discussion regarding the evolution of the standard of proof, see supra
note 26 and accompanying text. See also 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1989).
153Id.
1S4Id.
155 Statements Before House Select Committee on Aging on Age-60 Rule for Pilots,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 202 at E-1 (Oct. 18, 1985) (quoting Anthony J.
Broderick, Associate Admin. for Aviations Standards).
156Id.
157 Too Old to Fly at 60? The FAA Should Consider Changing a Rule Barring Pilots
Age 60 and Over From Flying, (from the N.Y. TIMES), THE Los ANGELES DAILY
J., Jan. 2, 1990.
158See Statements Before House Select Committee on Aging on Age-60 Rule for
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disabilities, . . . [and therefore], airline pilots should not be permitted
to serve past [the] age [of] sixty.
161
In the years following the adoption of the Age Sixty Rule, "the FAA... has
been [unable] to find an alternative approach to the rule that [it is] confident
will protect the American travelling public."162 There are several safety reasons
which support this rule:
IF]irst, there is a deterioration of many functions with age; second,
aging is accompanied by an increased frequency of sudden or
insidious incapacitation or death from various disease processes; and
third, despite scientific advances that have occurred, there is still no
way to predict, with [reasonable] accuracy, the presence or onset of a
number of medical problems in an individual aging pilot or to detect
and measure all of the possible declining physiological . ..
functions.
163
Thus, several factors related to flight safety have proven difficult to measure.
164
Flight safety was the concern underlying the Age Sixty Rule and thus could not
be ignored.165
The FAA's report demonstrated that the older the pilot the greater the
accident rate.166 Furthermore, technology is not avanced enough to identify
those pilots who can safely perform the duties under Part 121 past the age of
161 Id. (quoting Matthew J. Rinaldo).
162 See Statements Before House Select Committee, (quoting Anthony J.
Broderick), supra n. 155. See, e.g., Aman v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 856 F.2d 946
(7th Cir. 1988); Baker v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 917 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
163Id. These factors relate to loss of ability in performing highly skilled tasks
at a rapid pace, to resist fatigue, to perform competently in stressful
environments, to maintain physical stamina, and to apply experience and
judgment in emergency situations. Id.
164 Hearings on Age-60 Rulefor Pilots Before the House Select Committee on Aging,
(statement of Anthony J. Broderick), supra note 155.
165 Id.
166Id. (statement of Anthony J. Broderick, regarding "[tihe influence of




sixty.167 Until such procedures are established, the Age Sixty Rule must remain
in effect.1 68
At least one court has held that the FAA's interpretation, once articulated,
will be entitled to considerable deference. 169 Such deference, however, should
in no way lighten the burden on the FAAto establish that its decision is logically
connected to a "sustainable reading of its mandate."170
Contrary to this position however, is the Supreme Court's decision in Western
Airlines Inc. v. Criswell.1 71 The Criswell Court asserted that although the FANs
Age Sixty Rule shall be considered "relevant evidence in the airline's BFOQ
defense, it is not to be accorded conclusive weight."172
Under 14 C.F.R. § 67, to be eligible to pilot a civil aircraft, a current medical
certificate must be issued as well as an airman's certificate.' 73 The medical
certification demonstrates that an individual has met the particular minimum
physical and mental criterion that is required of all pilots while the airman's
certificate attests to the pilot's aviation skills. In recent years the FAA has shown
an increased willingness to issue medical certifications, under § 67.19 of the
167 Id. This study has been criticized however: "[Tlhe Flight Time Study has
serious flaws." 59 U.S.L.W. 2313 (Nov. 27,1990). The primary criticism being
that the "data for pilots under age 60 includes millions of relatively safe air
carrier miles flown, miles that because of the Age-60 Rule were unavailable to
pilots over age 60." Next, since all pilots in a 10-year age cohort are combined
into a single statistic, a single point represents pilots age 60-69. In all
probability, "more exemptions from the Age-60 Rule would likely be granted
to pilots under 65 than pilots over that age." Thus, "the cumulation of accidents
caused by pilots in their late 60's, with accidents caused by pilots in their early
60's, may tend to distort the study." 53 U.S.L.W. 2313.
168 Hearings on Age-60 Rule for Pilots Before the House Select Committee on Aging,
(statement of Anthony J. Broderick), supra note 155. The airline industry and
labor spokesmen appear to be in agreement with the FAA, as is evidenced by
a recent statement by a spokesman for the Air Transport Association that
"[w]hile we understand age 60 is an arbitrary figure, we have seen no
compelling evidence to change it." Don Phillips, Study Has Good and Bad News
For Airline Pilots Over 60, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1990, at A2. A spokesman for
the Air Line Pilots Association supported the foregoing in noting that there is
"nothing conclusive" to show whether experience or age is more critical after
age 60. Id.
169 Aman v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 856 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1988).
170 Id. at 957.
171472 U.S. 400 (1985).
172 Id. at 418.
17314 C.F.R. § 67.3(c) (1986). Medical certificates are issued by the FAA after
the applicant for the certificate is examined by a designated medical examiner
pursuant to §§ 67.13, 67.15, 67.17 (1987).
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regulation, to pilots otherwise disqualified by episodes of heart disease or
alcoholism.174 Approximately 1,300 of these special certificates have been
issued to those qualifying under either category.175 However, no pilots have
been granted an exception from the age restriction. 176
Many interpret this policy as revealing the arbitrariness and inconsistency
of a rule that excludes those from piloting simply because of age; even though
they may be the most qualified. 177 Part of the rationale for the exemption is to
allow the FAA flexibility in the application of the rules.178 However, this
rationale is undermined by the fact that the Age Sixty Rule was adopted
because the FAA knew of no other way to determine the extent of deterioration
in physical and psychological capacity that accompany age.179 Excluding a
sixty year old pilot in perfect health, while allowing a younger pilot who suffers
from cardiovascular disease to direct an aircraft is enigmatic. 180
The FAA admits that there is no hard evidence that a sixty year old airline
pilot is at a greater risk of physical or mental impairment than one who is thirty
174GAO Finds Government Granted No Exceptions to Mandatory Age-60
Retirement Rule For Pilots, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 232 at A-12 (Dec. 5,1989).
14 C.F.R. § 67.19 refers to the special issue of medical certificates. At the
discretion of the Federal Air Surgeon, a medical certificate may be issued to an
applicant who does not meet the required physical and mental standards and
thus would otherwise not be eligible to become an authorized pilot. The
applicant must show that "the duties authorized by the class of medical
certificate applied for can be performed without endangering air commerce
during the period in which the certificate would be in force."
175 GAO Finds Government Granted No Exceptions to Mandatory Age-60
Retirement Rule For Pilots, supra note 174.
176Id.
177Id. (quoting House Aging Committee Chairman Edward Roybal
(D-Calif), who requested the study of the FAA Regulation by the General
Accounting Office, "[t]he GAO report demonstrates how the time is long
overdue for a rethinking of the rationale and basis for the rule").
178 Id.
179Id.
180Some may not find such an application of the rule to be troubling in light
of the Office of Technology Assessment's 1990 report. The agency concluded
that there is only a slight chance that a commercial airline crash would result
from a pilot's sudden incapacitation due to, for example, a heart attack. See
Phillips, supra note 174, at A2. Since a co-pilot and, at times, a flight engineer
are present, pilot accidents are usually due to "mental error rather than the
pilot's incapacitation or impairment." Moreover, the data indicates that after
age 59 a subtle deterioration in cognitive functioning may occur but that those





years old.181 Yet, the Agency is reluctant to abandon the blanket provision
because a case by case determination could be costly and inefficient. 182
However, it was reported that the FAA planned to fund a study on the
relationship between age and accident rates in fiscal year 1991;183 this may
mean that the FAA is willing to consider other alternatives to the Age Sixty
Rule.
Meanwhile, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit recently upheld the Age Sixty Rule; the opinion, however, was
far from an unequivocal endorsement.184 The court in Baker v. Federal Aviation
concluded that the FAA order "is supported by substantial, albeit not
compelling evidence," but adds that the Agency "should not take this as a signal
that the Age Sixty Rule is sacrosanct and untouchable. Obviously, there is a
great body of opinion that the time has come to move on."185 In his dissent,
Judge Will states that the "rigid" FAA rule, and the Agency's refusal to grant an
exemption to it, means that every pilot "regardless of his physical condition or
experience becomes a significantly greater safety hazard" on his or her sixtieth
birthday. "The evidence in this case does not warrant that conclusion. Nor does
everyday, ordinary good old common sense."186
Although the FAA regulation will certainly be considered by a court in
determining whether an employer is justified in discriminating on the basis of
age due to safety considerations, it does not automatically establish such a
defense.187Thus the FAA appears to establish that age is a BFOQ for pilots in
181 See GAO Finds Government Granted No Exceptions to Mandatory Age-60 Rule
for Pilots, supra note 174. In fact, a report released by the Office of Technology
Assessment found that pilots over the age of 60 have an accident rate twice as
high as pilots in their 50's, but have a lower accident rate than pilots in their
20's and 30's. See Phillips, supra note 168.
182 GAO Finds Government Granted No Exceptions to Mandatory Age-60 Rule for
Pilots, supra note 174.
183 Id. The study is being conducted by the Hilton Corporation and is due to
be completed in October of 1992. Telephone Interview with an attorney at the
Department of Transportation who wished to remain anonymous (Nov. 7,
1991).
184 Baker v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 917 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991). (A 2 to 1 decision involving a request by 30 pilots to
overturn the Age-60 Rule).
185 Id. at 322.
186 1d. at 326.
187 See Criswell, 472 U.S. 400,418 (1985). In Criswell, the Supreme Court stated
that:
Although the FAA's rule for pilots, adopted for safety reasons, is relevant
evidence in the airline's BFOQ defense, it is not to be accorded conclusive
weight (citation omitted). The extent to which the rule is probative varies
1992]
33Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1992
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
the airline industry. However, the regulation is not conclusive evidence in and
of itself.
Other courts have begun to question the legitimacy of the rule and its strict
application. In 1988, Aman v. Fed. Aviation Admin. 188 was decided by the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In Aman, current and former airline captains
sought review of an FAA order denying a petition for exemption from the Age
Sixty Rule under 49 U.S.C. 1486(a).189 The Seventh Circuit noted that potential
flight problems stemming from age may be offset by the increased experience
of an elder pilot.190 The advances in medical science which would permit more
precise individual testing might justify revocation of the umbrella provision.191
In essence, while one Court of Appeals has held that the FAA's rule has not
constituted an abuse of discretion in the past, as medical technology develops
to a point where individual testing is feasible, it may become one. 192 If the Age
Sixty Rule was to be retracted, the airline industry would find itself without a
means of justifying age as a BFOQ for the position of commercial airline pilot.
For the time being, age will be considered a BFOQ in instances involving
public safety. However, an employer must meet rigorous proof requirements
to establish that a safety based BFOQ is warranted. An employer must be
certain that it does not rely solely on the FAA Age Sixty Rule to establish such
a defense for certain aircraft employees. It is apparent that the courts will not
tolerate an employer's attempt to circumvent the goals of the ADEA by alleging
that safety considerations justify a policy of age limitation.
C. Broad Judicial Interpretation
Many courts have had the opportunity to examine the airlines assertion that
age limitation policies establish a BFOQ. What has resulted are conflicting
decisions which have amounted to two different tests for determining what
with the weight of the evidence supporting its safety rationale and "the
congruity between the ... occupations at issue."
Id.
188856 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1988).
189 Id. at 946-47.
190 1d. at 957.
191 Id. at 948. At the time of adoption the Age-60 Rule in 1959, the FAA noted
that "medical science may at some future time develop accurate, validly
selective tests which would safely allow selected pilots to fly in air carrier
operations after age 60." 24 Fed. Reg. 9772 (1959).
192 Gray v. FAA, 594 F.2d 793, 795 (10th Cir. 1979) (although the court held
that at the time, the FAA's policy of denying all exemptions to the Age-60 Rule
was not an abuse of discretion, it noted that "[a]t some point, the state of the
medical art may become so compellingly supportive of a capacity to determine
functional age equivalents in individual cases that it would be an abuse of




employers must establish in order to be successful in an age discrimination suit
where their defense is based upon a BFOQ. 193 One line of cases suggests that
employers may establish a valid BFOQ by demonstrating that the elimination
of the age policy involved would increase the risk of harm to the public. 194
Under this standard, any increase in safety risk due to the employment of older
persons, no matter how minimal, would be sufficient to establish age as a
BFOQ.195
Such an example may be observed in Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 196
where the forty-three year old plaintiff applied for the position of flight officer
when the airline maintained a policy of refusing to hire anyone over the age of
thirty.1 9 7 The position of flight officer was the lowest of three cockpit positions,
the other two being co-pilot and captain. 198 American's policy was to train the
subordinate crew members for the eventual goal of captaincy; all crew
members were hired with this concept in mind. 199 The promotional process
took an average of fourteen to twenty years,20 0 and American forbade anyone
from establishing a permanent career in either of the subordinate positions. 201
Evidence at trial showed that "pilot error" accounted for 90% of all aviation
accidents but that the incidence of accidents decreased as the pilot gained
experience. 202 Since a pilot's experience would increase as he got older, the
increased age of a pilot was a benefit to safety.203 Thus, the best way to minimize
pilot error was to require a long training period.204
193 Lake, supra note 29, at 39.
194 This test was formulated in Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 859. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
195 Lake, supra note 29 at 39.
196667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
197 1d. at 99-100.
1981d. at 99.
199 Id. Thus American had an "up or out" policy whereby it was required of
all flight officers to advance to the position of Captain, and no one was "hired
by American without this goal in mind." Consequently, if a flight officer or
co-pilot had received the maximum amount of training needed for a position
and was not qualified at that time to advance to the next position, then
American would terminate that person. Therefore, this policy did not allow for
a career as a flight officer or co-pilot.
2
°°Murnane, 667 F.2d at 100, n.2.
2 0 1 Id. at 99.
202 Id. at 100.
203Id.
204 Murnane, 667 F.2d at 101.
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The D.C. Circuit held that the policy was a BFOQ because the maximization
of safety was reasonably necessary for the normal operation of the airline and
that the safe transportation of its passengers was the essence of American's
business. 205 American successfully justified its discriminating policy by
establishing that an age lower than forty resulted in experienced pilots
remaining in the position of captain for a longer period of time before they were
required to retire.206 Emphasis was placed on the fact that the hiring policies
may result in the death of one less person than if American was required to
abandon or modify the policy.20 7 The opinion also stated that courts do not
possess the expertise with which to supplant an employers' judgments in a case
presenting safety as the critical element.208 In addition, the court determined
that the airline industry was to be accorded "great leeway and discretion" when
determing how the industry may be operated safely.2 0 9
In Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc.,2 10 the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
District of Columbia in Murnane.211 The plaintiffs were American Airlines'
captains who wished to remain working as flight officers beyond their sixtieth
birthdays.212 American's evidence showed that its policy against placing
former pilots in the flight engineer's position improved crew coordination and
prevented the danger of "back seat driving."213 The defense was also related to
American's "up or out"2 14 policy previously discussed in Murnane. The court
concluded that American had promulgated a BFOQ defense and that safety
factors weighed heavily in favor of supporting American's on the job training
and recoupment of investment in pilot training.215
Because pilots must retire at age sixty, while flight engineers may choose to
continue working, pilots approaching age sixty often attempt to "downbid"216
205 Id.
206 1d.
207 1d. at 101.
208 Murnane, 667 F.2d at 101.
209 Id.
210745 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1029 (1985).
211 Note that the two cases differ in that Johnson did not involve a refusal of
initial employment, whereas Murnane did.
212Johnson, 745 F.2d at 991.
2 13 Id. at 991, 994. "Back seat driving" occurs when a senior airman who has
been placed in a subordinate position, mentally or physically resumes his
former role as Captain during emergencies.
214 See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
2 15Murnane, 667 F.2d at 101.
2 16 Oftentimes, a Captain may remain with the airline only by obtaining the




for a position as a flight engineer. Resolution of this issue has met with
increased difficulty in that some collective bargaining agreements prohibit
downbidding.217 In Trans World Airlines v. Thurston,218 TWA permitted flight
engineers to continue working past the age of sixty but did not automatically
allow captains to transfer to flight engineer status after being forced to retire
under the Age Sixty Rule.2 19 A pilot approaching the age of sixty could bid for
a position as flight engineer, but if no vacancy occurred before his sixtieth
birthday, he was forced to retire.220
The plaintiffs alleged that the policy violated the ADEA because a pilot who
was displaced for any reason other than age, such as a medical disability, could
"bump" less senior flight engineers and did not have to resort to the bidding
system.22 1 The Supreme Court found that TWA's transfer policy discriminated
on the basis of age against those pilots who could not find a vacant flight
engineer position.222 The BFOQ defense did not apply in this instance because
being under the age of sixty was not a BFOQ for the position of flight
engineer.223
Thurston is distinguishable from Murnane and Johnson in that the Court in
Thurston did not address the establishment of a BFOQ for flight engineer when
that position was used as the first step of a training program in which the goal
was the position of captaincy.224 Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that the
airline employed a great number of persons who were over sixty years old and
thus TWA could not effectively make such an argument 225
airline. The procedure requires a Captain, prior to his sixtieth birthday, to
submit a bid for the position of flight engineer. When a vacancy occurs it is
given to the most senior Captain. If no vacancy opens prior to his sixtieth
birthday or a pilot lacks sufficient seniority to bid for the vacancy, the Captain
must retire. See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
2 17 Nachman, supra note 9, at 39.
218469 U.S. 111 (1985).
219Id. at 116.
2201d.
221 Id. at 116-17. A Captain with a medical disability could automatically
displace a flight engineer with less seniority without having to depend on the
availability of a vacancy.
222 1d. at 121-24.
223 Thurston, 469 U.S. at 123.
224 See Raper, supra note 11, at 576.
225 Thurston, 469 U.S. at 121.
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D. Narrow Judicial Interpretation
A second line of cases sets forth a more stringent two-part BFCQ test based
on the Weeks 226 -Diaz227 line of cases. In Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,228
a pilot who had been transferred to another position challenged McDonnell
Douglas' reduction of its pilot staff on the basis of age. The employer argued
that declining production rates required this reduction.229 After the plaintiff
refused the transfer, and when no other acceptable position could be found, he
was discharged.2 30 Based upon the evidence presented, the court determined
that McDonnell Douglas was not entitled to a BFOQ defense.231 The court
noted that although the aging process occurs at diverse rates among different
individuals and that there may be no functional test for determining individual
capacity, in general, (1) the employee had been given physical exams and was
found to be in such exceptional health that it was 99.9% certain he would not
have a heart attack or stroke in flight; (2) the aging process occurs more slowly
and to a lesser degree among professional pilots; and (3) statistical studies
reveal the accident rate among professional pilots decreases with age.232
Applying the Weeks test, as interpreted by Tamiami, the court held that the
employer failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that all or substantially
all older pilots are unable to perform safely the duties of test pilot, or that some
older pilots possess physical traits unascertainable except through reference to
a pilot's chronological age, which would preclude safe and efficient job
performance.233 Based on the slower aging process among pilots, medical
technology's ability to detect a disabling physical condition in a test pilot with
absolute accuracy, and the reduced accident rate among professional pilots, no
BFOQ exemption was justified.2m
226 Weeks, 408 F.2d at 228; see supra notes 65-67, 111-13 and accompanying
text.
227 Diaz, 442 F.2d at 385; see supra notes 103-07, 110 and accompanying text.
228553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1978).
229 Id. at 562-63.
230OId.
2 3 1 Id. at 563-64.
232 Id. Evidence was brought in to show that the primary cause of accidents
among pilots was erroneous judgment and with respect to the fatalities
suffered by the employer in flying accidents, all of the pilots were in their 30's.
Id. at 563.





This two-part test was applied one week after the Murnane decision235 by
the Fourth Circuit in Smallwood v. United Airlines.236 However, the court in
Smallwood reached an opposite conclusion. 237 In Smallwood, the challenge was
to United's rule denying employment to pilot applicants over age thirty-five. 23 8
The plaintiff applied for the position of flight engineer at forty-eight years of
age, after having acquired ten years of flight experience with another airline.23 9
The airline claimed that safety would be adversely affected if it were forced
to hire pilots over the age of thirty-five, in that it would hamper its "crew
concept" - the safe and efficient operation of its three man crews in a
coordinated manner.240 It also argued that it would raise significantly the
average age of pilot personnel thus disproportionately increasing the chance
of medical emergencies. In addition, hiring older pilots would cause economic
detriment.241
Based on the evidence presented, the Court of Appeals found that United
had failed to meet its burden of showing a BFOQ and that economic
considerations could not serve as the basis for a BFOQ 242 The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the second prong of the two-part test had not been met because
United did not show that substantially all pilots hired within Smallwood's age
range would be unable to perform efficiently.243 Moreover, the court concluded
that United's medical tests were sufficiently advanced to determine which of
the potential pilots may cause a safety risk.244
The court did not refer to the decision in Murnane, thus leading one to
speculate as to the interpretation and reconciliation of the two cases. The
Smallwood court may have been influenced by United's attempt to base its
BFOQ on economic justifications, 245 while the Murnane court saw American's
235667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
236661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982).
237 See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.





24 1 Id. at 306-07.
242 Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 308. For a discussion of the two-part test which an
employer must fulfill in order to establish a BFOQ defense, see supra notes
109-14 and accompanying text.
243 Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 308-09.
244Id
.
245 See Belinda Reed, Comment, Age Discrimination of Airline Pilots: Effects of
the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 48 J. AIR L. & CoM. 383, 402 (1983).
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similar policy as providing only incidental economic benefits to an otherwise
valid BFOQ.246
In 1985, the Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the BFOQ defense
to mandatory retirement for flight engineers in Western Airlines, Inc. v.
Criswell.247 Prior to their sixtieth birthdays, the plaintiffs, who were commercial
carrier pilots, sought to evade mandatory retirement under the Age Sixty Rule
by bidding on flight engineer positions.248 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous
decision for the plaintiffs, noted that the flight engineer did not operate flight
controls unless the captain and first officer became incapacitated, and that the
FAA refused to establish a mandatory retirement age for flight engineers, as it
had for pilots and first officers.249
The heart of Western's contention was that the proper standard of proof for
the BFOQ defense was whether there existed a factual and rational basis for it
to believe that the use of flight engineers over the age of sixty would increase
the probability of risk to its passengers. 250 Justice Stevens, writing for a majority
of the court, found that the airline's evidence was not sufficient to allow such
deference on the issue of safety.251 The standard for establishing a BFOQ was
"reasonable necessity" and not "reasonableness". 252
The Court expressly recognized that Congress, the federal courts, and the
EEOC had consistently applied the two-pronged inquiry promulgated by
Tamiami2 53 when evaluating the BFOQ exception.254 In support of its
determination, the court noted that the two-part test was "implicitly endorsed"
by way of the 1978 amendments to the ADEA, 255 that "every Court of Appeals
that has confronted a BFOQ defense has analyzed the problem consistently
with the Tamiami standard,"256 and that the EEOC has "embrace[d] the same
criteria.'1257 It also stated that "this two-part inquiry properly identifies the
relevant considerations for resolving a BFOQ defense to an age-based
246Id.
247 Criswell, 472 U.S. 400.
248 Id. at 404-05.
2 4 9 Id. at 403-04.
2501d. at 422.
251 Criswell, 472 U.S. at 419-21.
2 5 2 Id. at 419.
253531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); see supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
254 Criswell, 472 U.S. at 416.
255 Id. at 415.
256 1d. at 416.
257 d. For a discussion of the EEOC's interpretation of the BFOQ see supra




qualification purportedly justified by consideration of safety."258 "This
adoption of the Tamiami standard in a unanimous [court] decision [deems
Criswell a crucial case] where a ... BFOQ defense... rest[s] squarely on the
[basis] of public safety.'"2 59 "In neither Thurston260 nor Criswell was the (Age 60
Rule) directly challenged;" and the Court, by not remarking on the credibility
of the rule may be demonstrating its willingness to accept the rule's validity.261
E. A Modified Judicial Interpretation
A modified version of the Weeks-Diaz test was applied by the District Court
in Tuohy v. Ford Motor C0.262 In Tuohy, a private company pilot was discharged
when he reached sixty years of age. The defendant claimed that the FAA's Age
Sixty Rule allowed it to terminate pilots in its private air transportation system
and stressed the importance of safety in air transportation. 263 The court held
that the FAA's determination that it is not possible to use factors other than age
to predict the likelihood of incapacitation constituted an absolute defense to
the age discrimination claim.264 In addition, the court urged that the first two
prongs of the first tier of the BFOQ defense be made more flexible when safety
factors are involved so that the public interest may be considered.265 The court
concluded that where safety factors are involved, employers need only be
"reasonable" in their decisions to utilize general age limitations.266
258 Criswell, 472 U.S. at 416-17.
259Max J. Schott, Note, Civil Rights - A Company's Policy Requiring the
Retirement of Certain Employees Under the Age of 70 for Reasons Allegedly
Attributable to Public Safety Must Satisfy the Two-Prong Test Established in
Tamiami Before it can Qualify as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Under the
Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 36 DRAKE L. REV. 213, 229 (Winter
1987).
260469 U.S. 111 (1985).
261 Id. See also Schott, supra note 259, at 229.
262490 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
2631d. at 260,262. The policy rested on the Age-60 Rule as codified in 14 C.F.R.
§ 121383(c). Even though Ford's air operations are not directly controlled by
14 C.F.R., Ford had adopted a majority of the safety regulations contained
therein. In addition, Ford claimed that it did not have the medical capabilities
to determine whether an individual pilot would be subject to a disabling
medical condition while in flight, thus it adopted the Age-60 Rule.
264Id. at 264.
265 Id. But see Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas, 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1978); see supra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
266 Tuohy, 490 F. Supp. at 264. The District court was reversed and the case
remanded since the operator failed to establish that its mandatory retirement
age of sixty was reasonably necessary for normal conduct of business, so as to
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The EEOC has further complicated this area by determining that an airline's
burden of proof does not end after satisfying the two-part test. The EEOC has
developed a third, and perhaps even a fourth BFOQ test.2 6 7 Section 1625.6(b)
of the Commission's interpretive guidelines268 state that employers asserting
a BFOQ defense have the burden of establishing that (1) the age limit is
reasonably necessary to the essence of the business, and, either, (2) that all or
substantially all individuals excluded from the job involved are in fact
disqualified, or (3) that some of the individuals so excluded possess a
disqualifying trait that cannot be ascertained except by reference to age.
The last sentence of § 1625.6(b) provides that "if the employer's objective in
asserting a BFOQ is the goal of public safety, the employer must prove that the
challenged practice does indeed effectuate that goal and that there is no
acceptable alternative which would better advance it or equally advance it with
a less discriminating impact."2 69 It is unclear whether the latter test must be
satisfied in addition to the other three elements or whether it is a separate
analysis in and of itself. If it is an additional prong, employers would find it
much more difficult to establish a BFOQ in cases that deal with issues of public
safety, even though several courts have been willing to hold employers to a
more lenient standard in such cases. 270
V. CONCLUSION
The courts have not concluded with any certainty which factors justify use
of the BFOQ defense in the airline industry. It is clear however, that if the airline
discriminates for economic reasons271 or to avoid a perceived increase in the
chance of medical consequences in flight,272 then the airline will not have
established a BFOQ defense. In addition, if the airline can prove that its
discriminatory policy is part of a legitimate training program designed to
produce the most experienced and capable pilots,273 the employee challenging
qualify as a BFOQ. Thus, it was not enough that an employer be merely
reasonable in establishing its policy. Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842
(1982).
267 See Lake, supra note 29, at 42.
268 See 46 Fed. Reg. 47727 (1981).
269 See Lake, supra note 29, at 4243.
2701d. This standard has been adopted from Title VII cases in which employer
practices having a disparate impact must be justified by demonstrating a
business necessity.
271 See supra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 196-208 and accompanying text; Johnson, supra notes
210-15 and accompanying text.




the policy may have to look elsewhere for employment. The considerations of
the passengers who depend upon safe air transportation outweigh the right of
an individual to maintain his piloting career for as long as he may desire.
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Criswell advocates strict
construction and stringent scrutinization when an employer attempts to
establish a BFOQ justification. The standard in Criswell is the most rational and
appropriate of those the various courts have seen fit to apply. Inherent in this
standard is an attempt to balance the rights of the employers, employees, and
the general public while ensuring that those who have been discriminated
against on the basis of age will somehow be compensated. Consequently,
according to the ADEA, employers who attempt to enforce any sort of
mandatory retirement policy involving employees who are under the age of
seventy should expect to come under strict judicial investigation. For these
reasons, employers should examine the underlying purposes of their policies.
Prior to the enactment of the ADEA, older workers were not protected
against age discrimination. Thus, employers were able to fire or force
retirement on employees solely because of their age.274 The ADEA has been
used to combat such inequities by balancing the interest of the older worker
against that of the employer.275 In invoking the BFOQ exemption, employers
are able to use age as a factor in their discriminatory policies if they can establish
a legitimate business necessity.
By allowing such an exception in the airline industry, the courts are
attempting to balance the rights of older workers against the right of the general
public to receive safe air transportation on commercial airlines. The airline
industry has been able to justify discrimination because the overriding concern
for public safety outweighs the goals of the ADEA and the interests of older
workers.
Although the courts have handled the BFOQ enigma to the best of their
ability, members of the transportation industry and members of the general
public are still struggling with the problems inherent in the defense. A joint
study by the Department of Transportation and the FAA, in conjunction with
a team of medical experts, is necessary to address the safety concerns in
transportation and to determine if and when functional age is a determinable
factor in job performance. The findings should be analyzed in order for
conclusions to be drawn as to how to test individuals' functional capabilities
with regard to particular jobs. Employers would then be able to implement
minimum physical and psychological standards as well as a policy of regularly
testing employees over the age of sixty. In utilizing such a program, employees
would be required to meet objective, age neutral criteria directly related to the
duties of a particular job.
274 See Lake, supra note 29, at 35.
275 See Lake, supra note 29, at 36.
1992]
43Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1992
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
If such a study is not produced, the courts will necessarily be forced to: (1)
adopt a standard which gives deference to the employers' policy decisions276
or (2) vacillate between different applications of the BFOQ without setting any
uniform standards.
TRACY KAREN FINKELSTEIN
276 However, simply upholding an employer's judgment regarding the
relationship between age and ability to perform a particular job is inconsistent
with the ADEA's purpose of eliminating the stereotyping of older workers
and/or promoting their employment. This could conceivably open the
floodgates for use of the BFOQ exception where the essence of a business
involved qualities associated with youth such as in the protective service's area.
Moreover, Criswell mandates that "[e]ven in cases involving public safety, the
ADEA plainly does not permit the trier of fact to give complete deference to
the employer's decision." 472 U.S. at 423.
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